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Key Supreme Court ruling on plant patents *
by Roger A. McEowen, associate professor of agricultural economics and extension specialist,
Kansas State University, member of Kansas and Nebraska Bars; and Neil E Harl,  Charles F.
Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and professor of economics, Iowa State
University; member of the Iowa Bar.
A late 2001 U.S. Supreme Court ruling thatnewly developed plant breeds are patentableunder the general utility patent laws of the
United States has important implications for farm-
ers, plant breeders and consumers.
Facts of the Case
Pioneer held seventeen general utility patents
covering the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for
sale of its inbred and hybrid corn seed products, and
sold the protected seeds under a limited label license
that allowed only the production of grain and/or
forage, and prohibited the use of the seed for propa-
gation or seed multiplication or the development of a
hybrid or different seed variety.  J.E.M Ag Supply
(J.E.M.) bought patented seeds in bags bearing the
license agreement.  When J.E.M resold the bags,
Pioneer sued for patent infringement.  J.E.M. moved
for summary judgment on the basis that Pioneer’s
patents were invalid because plants are not patent-
able subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. §
101, and that the Plant Patent Act (PPA) and the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the
only statutory protection for intellectual property
rights in plants.  J.E.M.’s motion was denied and
the trial court ruled for Pioneer, the Federal Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Scope of 35 U.S.C. §101 – the Patentability of Plants
35 U.S.C.§101 provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title.”
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Congress drafted 35 U.S.C. §101
broadly with the intent that the patent laws be
given wide scope, and held that a manmade micro-
organism fell within the statute’s scope.  The Court
noted that the Congress made a statutory distinc-
tion between products of nature and manmade
inventions, rather than between living and inani-
mate things.
The Court’s language in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
was generally believed to be sufficiently broad to
suggest that even plants that could be protected
under the PPA or the PVPA could be the object of a
general utility patent.  Indeed, this position was
confirmed in a 1985 case involving genetically engi-
neered corn, and since that time the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has issued nearly 2,000 utility
patents for plants, plant parts, and seeds under 35
U.S.C. §101.  Consequently, the Pioneer Court had no
trouble holding that newly developed plant breeds
fall within the scope of 35 U.S.C. §101.
Exclusivity of PPA and PVPA
The crux of J.E.M.’s position was that the Congress,
in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, provided the
exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life
because both Acts are more specific than 35 U.S.C.
§101 and thereby carve out plants from utility patent
law for special treatment.  However, the Court noted
that the PPA did not contain any statutory language
indicating that the Congress intended the PPA to
serve as sole means of protection for asexually
reproduced plants.  J.E.M. also maintained that the
Congress intended the PPA as the sole means of
protection for intellectual property rights in plants
because existing general utility patent laws (as of
1930) did not allow for patents on plants, and that
there would have been no reason to enact the PPA
had general utility patent law allowed plant patents.
The Court disagreed, reasoning instead that J.E.M.’s
argument failed to account for the state of patent law
and plant breeding as of 1930, which involved a
general presumption that plants were products of
nature and were not amenable to the written descrip-
tion requirement of utility patent law.  Thus, when
the PPA was enacted, the Congress believed that
plants were not patentable under utility patent law
because they were viewed as living things not ame-
nable to a written description, and not because they
could not have been patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. §101.
The Court also rejected J.E.M.’s argument that the
PVPA was the exclusive mechanism for protecting
intellectual property rights in plants.  The Court
noted that the language of the PVPA did not restrict
the scope of patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. §101, and did not contain any statement of
exclusivity.  The Court took particular note that, at
the time of the PVPA’s enactment in 1970, the PTO
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had already issued numerous utility patents for
hybrid plant processes, and had assigned utility
patents for plants since 1985 with no indication from
the Congress that such action was inconsistent with
the PVPA or the PPA.
Implications of the Court’s Opinion
In recent years, seed companies have been taking
legal action against farmers for saving seed pro-
tected by a utility patent.  Much of that litigation
was on hold pending the Supreme Court’s opinion.  It
is now expected that the litigation will resume and
intensify.  An important point is that conventional
seed as well as genetically modified seed may be
patented.  Farmers using such seed do not have the
right to save any of the seed for replanting.
The opinion is also anticipated to further accelerate
the amount of germplasm that is held privately
rather than in the public domain as seed companies
devote additional resources to patent any seed that
is economically worth planting, whether genetically
modified or conventional.  That could have serious
ramifications for the breeding programs of public
plant breeders.  Relatedly, the opinion clears the way
for inbred and hybrid seed products developed by
public research institutions to be patented consistent
with the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  This could result in
public research being directed to a greater extent
towards satisfying the desires of the firms that
purchase the rights to the patents or otherwise exert
pressure on public research, and to a lesser extent
towards the desires of farmers and consumers.
The opinion could also lead to increased concentra-
tion, now approaching monopoly in some areas, of
germplasm in private hands, reduced competition
and innovation in plant breeding (including that
from public breeding), increased concentration due to
small seed companies being unable to find new
breeding material, and greater control by the firm
holding the patent over the crops grown from pat-
ented seed.  Consumers may ultimately be nega-
tively impacted by such events.
Clearly, the Congress bears the burden to modify the
existing statutory language of 35 U.S.C.§101, the
PPA or the PVPA if it is desired that plants not be
patentable, or the projected impacts of the Court’s
opinion be avoided.
